

# TinyPOS:

## An analysis of a Point-Of-Sale malware ecosystem

Forcepoint Research Report

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30 April 2019

Public

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## The Power of 4K

What is the very first thing that comes to mind when we see "4K"? For the casual, tech-savvy person it's probably the ultra-high definition of recent years' TV models. For anyone who has been using a computer since the dawn of the PC era, it might mean a 'demo' program: a small piece of low-level code that creates outstanding (for the system it runs on, at least) 3D visuals on screen. For the less tech savvy one, it might just mean good old cash. Curiously, both of these last two definitions can be applied to our latest investigation.

When we discovered [UDPoS](#) last year, we had mixed views on both it and recent Point-of-Sale (POS) malware in general. On one hand we didn't really expect anything new in terms of POS malware, on the other, we could easily identify the underlying reasons why these threats are still popular.

UDPoS was a warning sign that the POS portion of the threat landscape is still something to keep an eye on. Meanwhile, events such as Kroll Cyber Security [revealing](#) PinkKite – a new POS based threat, although with little to no tangible information available - and activities on the infamous Joker's Stash [site](#) made us dig deeper.

## Tiny + Loader

For more than a year we have been tracking a delivery mechanism built around very small components created purely in assembly. It's not entirely uncommon to see malware code created in such a way, however trends of recent years have been towards the usage and adoption of high-level languages (C/C++/C#/Delphi/Java/GO etc) rather than low-level coding. Generally, with high bandwidth internet connections and powerful desktops there is little benefit in putting extra effort into hand-crafting assembly: the difference in both delivery and execution time won't generally be noticeable. Still, it was evident that *someone* still has a taste for more traditional methods of writing malware.

## Delivery

During our investigation we haven't come across samples being delivered as the primary payload (or email attachment) of an attack. Instead, they've been delivered as an additional payload alongside well-known banking trojan families such as Emotet or IcedID. Long term tracking provided us the opportunity to gather various samples and components of the Tiny ecosystem, as a result we have now analyzed over 2000 unique samples. These components fall into four main categories: 'loaders', 'mappers', 'cleaners' and 'scrapers', with loaders reflecting about 95% of the total population and all of the components falling into the 2-7kb range. We will elaborate more on the function of the different components later.

## How it works

### The loader

It all starts with the delivery of a small loader called TinyLoader, an obfuscated executable with simple – yet powerful – downloader functionality. Upon execution, it will first brute force its own decryption key (a 32-bit value, meaning this takes a fraction of second on modern PCs) before using this to decrypt the main program code.

The core functionality of the decrypted code is communication with a set of hardcoded C2 servers by IP and port. If the C2 is active, it will provide what is effectively a piece of shellcode, encrypted by another 32-bit constant. This shellcode is not 'fire and forget': it instead sees the loader establish a semi-interactive two-way communication with the C2.

Note that the earliest traits and [mentions](#) of TinyLoader go back to as far as 2015.

## The shellcode

The shellcode's first action is to download snippets of a longer piece of code into memory in multiple steps, concatenate them, and execute the resulting program once the code is complete.

The first payload built this way enumerates through the process list of the victim's PC, flagging every process which is not included in a hardcoded blacklist. This blacklist consists mainly of system process names stored in a shortened four-character long format. The list of processes is then sent back to the C2 and the loader begins building another piece of in-memory shellcode.

This second piece of code is an HTTP based downloader that awaits further parameters that specify what to download, from where, and where to save it on the local system. Often the executable downloaded here is another TinyLoader pointing to yet another IP/port combination. This method seems to serve no specific purpose other than making the execution chain longer and potentially breaking dynamic analysis environments. If the victim's PC meets the desired criteria – for example it's a POS system – then another payload will be delivered and executed.

```

00000916: 813973766368      cmp     d,[ecx],068637673 ;'hcvs'
0000091C: 0F84EC000000      jz     000000A0E --↓1
00000922: 813953797374      cmp     d,[ecx],074737953 ;'tsyS'
00000928: 0F84E0000000      jz     000000A0E --↓1
0000092E: 8139736D7373      cmp     d,[ecx],073736D73 ;'ssms'
00000934: 0F84D4000000      jz     000000A0E --↓1
0000093A: 81396578706C      cmp     d,[ecx],06C707865 ;'lpxe'
00000940: 0F84C8000000      jz     000000A0E --↓1
00000946: 813963737273      cmp     d,[ecx],073727363 ;'srsc'
0000094C: 0F84BC000000      jz     000000A0E --↓1
00000952: 813977696E6C      cmp     d,[ecx],06C6E6977 ;'lniw'
00000958: 0F84B0000000      jz     000000A0E --↓1
0000095E: 81396C736173      cmp     d,[ecx],07361736C ;'sas1'
00000964: 0F84A4000000      jz     000000A0E --↓1
0000096A: 813973706F6F      cmp     d,[ecx],06F6F7073 ;'oops'
00000970: 0F8498000000      jz     000000A0E --↓1
00000976: 8139616C672E      cmp     d,[ecx],02E676C61 ;'.gla'
0000097C: 0F848C000000      jz     000000A0E --↓1
00000982: 813977696E69      cmp     d,[ecx],0696E6977 ;'iniw'
00000988: 0F8480000000      jz     000000A0E --↓1
0000098E: 813973746561      cmp     d,[ecx],061657473 ;'aets'
00000994: 7478              jz     000000A0E --↓1
00000996: 8139736B7970      cmp     d,[ecx],070796B73 ;'pyks'
0000099C: 7470              jz     000000A0E --↓1
0000099E: 813964776D2E      cmp     d,[ecx],02E6D7764 ;'.mwd'
000009A4: 7468              jz     000000A0E --↓1
000009A6: 813953656172      cmp     d,[ecx],072616553 ;'raeS'

```

Figure 1 - Example of the process blacklist embedded into shellcode

## The POS payload - scrapers

Code-wise the POS component is very similar to the loader, except there is no additional encryption, as whenever it is delivered the operators are almost certain - due to the pre-filtering above - that a valuable target has been identified.

This component works like any other POS memory scraper: opening processes based on either a predefined black or whitelist of process names, creating a new thread for each matching one and scanning their full memory range for Track 1 and Track 2 credit card data. If such data is found, first it will be verified by the Luhn algorithm for integrity, then it will be encrypted by a pre-defined key (another 32 or 64-bit value stored in the POS binary itself) and either sent to yet another C2 identified, again, by IP/port combination or it will be saved locally.

Example of Track 1 data:

```
%B4XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX2^DOE/JOHN^1305101000000001000000003000000?
```

Example of Track 2 data:

```
;5XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX2=1103101000000300001?
```

Example of stolen Track 2 data before encryption:

```
40000000000000002=19011010000012300000 *test_pos.exe
```

Note the process name – the one data was stolen from - added at the end of the record.

## The mappers

There is a special component type that we have chosen to call ‘mappers’. Their main purpose is to gather information about the PC and the environment it was executed on. That's done by making a map of active processes (either all running processes or just those from a pre-defined black or whitelist, depending on the sample) and looking for local system (i.e. Autorun registry keys, Image path for active processes) and network related information. Processes are flagged differently depending on whether they could be opened or not.

For the network reconnaissance capability, the execution of the ‘net view’ command was implemented in a non-standard way by utilizing named pipes instead of simply executing a command shell. We believe ‘mappers’ help the operators gather extensive knowledge of different POS system layouts and also to deploy campaigns targeting only specific retailers.

*Some of the mapping samples contain no less than 200+ unique POS process names in their embedded whitelist. To put that into perspective, a merchant will typically buy one model of POS terminal to use across their business, with these solutions generally covering both hardware and software components. As there are no trial editions of POS software bundles freely available on the internet, gathering insights of the components is no easy job. Judging by the sheer numbers, it's safe to assume that many years of background research and information gathering is reflected in these whitelists.*

```

1 "accupo","active","adres3","afr38","afr8.e","ag11pd","aldelo","alohae","alohat","atm.ex","atxexe","b2cllc","back o"
2 "backof","barque","bbacku","bo.exe","boagen","boeft","bopos","bosrv","bosrve","boutil","brain","brstdv","cajare"
3 "campus","cardre","cardwo","ccprin","ccs.ex","ccv_se","centra","cicipo","client","cmacic","cmcage","concor","counte"
4 "cpsvcs","cre200","credit","dbstps","ddcdsr","drvcom","dscc.e","dsicar","dsicon","dsihea","dsimer","dsinas","dsipdc"
5 "dsipor","dsirap","dsirbs","dspos3","dvd ma","dwnam","e7.exe","e8back","easipo","edc.ex","edcsvn","eft.ex","eftpos"
6 "eftsvr","egenui","epayad","epixpo","epos.e","eps_ca","eps_ge","epseng","erpm_p","esmart","esprun","expres","fastba"
7 "fboserv","fin.ex","focus","focus","fpos.e","freewa","frontb","gcomcl","generi","ghserv","gpdire","gtb.ex","gtb2.e"
8 "host2","hyperc","iastor","iber.e","iberqs","icarz","inetcc","infini","ingeni","intuit","invent","ipmgui","issdeb"
9 "isspos","java.e","javaw","jpos.e","jregil","keypay","keystr","kpsvc","liaiso","maximu","mdshtt","mdtran","menulo"
10 "mercsv","mercur","micro$","millen","mitels","msrwd","mxslip","mysqld","naviga","ncrloa","nextge","nmp_c","nthost"
11 "omnipo","opos.e","ops.ex","paladi","pccw.e","pccwin","pcvpos","pdv.ex","pdvnfc","pgterm","pixela","pixelp","plwins"
12 "pops.e","pos vi","pos.ex","pos210","pos5ma","posdps","posisy","posiw","posrep","poster","postoo","poswin","powerp"
13 "prowin","ptoven","pxpp.e","qbcfmo","qbidps","qbmsgm","qbpos","qbposd","qbw32p","refpos","regist","resdbs","rmaler"
14 "rmccwi","rmos","rpro8","rpro9","rs232m","rw5mai","sistem","sitcie","sitddt","sitdis","sitred","sitsaf","slysm"
15 "smarp","soposu","spcwin","spgage","sqlser","stserv","sympho","syspdv","teckey","top_po","tpe_53","tpg_se","tpgsen"
16 "trader","tripos","upos.o","utg2.e","utg2sv","uvsh.e","versic","versig","vitech","vmcli_","vmsrv","vposte","w3wp.e"
17 "washse","wc_cor","webpos","winpos","winvpq","workst","wposip","wpro.e","xcharg","xchrgs","xtouch"

```

Figure 2 – Example of POS related process names used by ‘mappers’

### The cleaners

As their name suggests, these components are responsible for cleaning up leftover content once the operation was finished. Such content can be running processes, Autorun registry keys, scheduled tasks and files in specific folders on the filesystem. Just like mappers, these modules are also customized for specific needs and won't always include every type of cleanup. Some would only kill a specific process and delete the corresponding executable while others might do all and also send the report of the successful – or failed - cleaning back to a C2.

## Obfuscation and anti-analysis techniques

While the individual components of the Tiny ecosystem can hardly be considered challenging from an analysis standpoint, they still utilize some basic obfuscation and anti-debug tricks. Note that not all of the techniques are utilized by every component, the early stage downloaders were meant to be protected more. Some techniques which were identified are as follows:

- Call / Push obfuscation
- Fake API calls
- Junk instructions
- Imports by hash
- Icon resource randomization
- VS\_VERSION\_INFO randomization
- Dynamic loading of all imported API functions
- Simple encryption layer added after compilation

```

.00402000: E8 0A 00 00-00 6E 74 64-6C 6C 2E 64-6C 6C 00 FF 05 ntdll.dll
.00402010: 15 C8 10 40-00 83 F8 00-74 32 E8 13-00 00 00 52 5E t20!! R
.00402020: 74 6C 41 64-6A 75 73 74-50 72 69 76-69 6C 65 67 7E tAdjustPrivileg
.00402030: 65 00 50 FF-15 C4 10 40-00 83 F8 00-74 0E 6A 00 7E e P $->@ â° tPj
.00402040: 54 6A 00 6A-01 6A 14 FF-D0 83 C4 04-E8 09 00 00 7E Tj j0j9 llâ-0o
.00402050: 00 73 32 6C-78 7A 61 30-64 00 6A 00-6A 00 FF 15 5E s2lxza0d j j $

```

Figure 3 – Example of Call / Push obfuscation

## The infrastructure

There are more than a dozen IP addresses utilized by the operators, however most used in older campaigns are either out of service or have been recycled by now. Even though the ports used to

change frequently (sometimes within a day) the IPs for ongoing campaigns are static. There are certain port numbers reserved for specific activities, for example port 17771 is always used by the memory scraper modules for data exfiltration. For a complete list of IPs and ports please refer to the IOC section.

IP	AS	AS Name
5.8.18.222	202425	INT-NETWORK, SC
23.228.232.92	40676	Psychz Networks, US
31.184.234.108	44050	PIN-AS, RU
46.161.40.145	58271	VSERVER-AS, UA
62.210.36.112	12876	AS12876, FR
77.72.84.115	29073	StartUPG-NET, GB
85.93.20.42	57509	LL-INVESTMENT-LTD, BG
85.93.5.136	200998	EMGOLDEXNET-AS, DE
91.197.232.26	200363	BK-AS, IE
95.154.199.104	20860	IOMART-AS, GB
179.43.147.209	51852	PLI-AS, CH
185.174.102.20	8100	QUADRANET-GLOBAL, US
185.183.160.137	206766	INETTECH1-AS, RU
185.248.100.188	44812	IPSERVER-RU-NET Fiord, RU
188.126.77.137	42708	PORTLANE, SE
193.142.30.201	59580	BATTERFLYAIMEDIA-AS, RU
193.28.179.200	58146	SVOD-NET, CZ
194.165.16.165	48721	ADM-SERVICE-AS, RU
194.165.16.166	48721	ADM-SERVICE-AS, RU
194.165.16.199	48721	ADM-SERVICE-AS, RU
199.165.16.165	195	SDSC-AS, US

Note that some of the IP addresses overlap with IPs previously used by the Cerber ransomware. Due to



the nature of how Cerber operates and the lack of additional evidence, we could not determine whether this was a coincidence or an actual link between the two different threats. The finite number of IPv4 addresses available can occasionally result in the coincidental recycling of addresses across unrelated campaigns and groups.

## Why are we still facing POS-based fraud?

There are several issues that come together to make POS systems a soft (and tempting) target.

### The software side

Firstly, the solutions are frequently based on old software technologies. Lots of POS applications are still based on POSReady 2009 (Windows XP based) or POSReady 7 (Windows 7 based) platforms, both of these are reaching their EOL in the upcoming months or years (see table below).

There is a new Windows 10 based POS platform called Windows IoT Enterprise, but migration and license costs can be challenging for many merchants.

Product	Extended Support End Date
Windows Embedded POSReady 2009	4/9/2019
Windows Embedded POSReady 7	10/12/2021
Windows 10 IoT Enterprise 2015 LTSC	10/14/2025
Windows 10 IoT Enterprise 2019 LTSC	1/9/2029

On top of that POS systems often have some sort of remote access application installed for remote management and troubleshooting. This could enlarge the attack surface as lost, stolen or unchanged default credentials might provide access for the adversaries. In certain cases, if standard database engines are deployed and data is still stored without any encoding or encryption, it might also provide the ability for the memory scraper module to not only intercept current transactions but also historical ones. Several TinyPOS samples contains SQL and MySQL related names (“sqlser”, “mysqld”) in their process whitelist.

### The hardware side

On the other side, hardware-based restrictions and outdated standards are an even greater concern. Magnetic strips (Track 1/2 type of data) are still being utilized due to the lack of EMV support world-wide. The EMV standard was originally written about 25 years ago, but adoption is much slower than expected.

### The liability factor

There are numerous types of credit card fraud, with POS-based theft making up only one, shrinking, piece of the whole. As total loss climbed up into the range of billions of dollars, banks were looking for a way to shift liability over to the merchants. In reality this means, since 1 January 2005 (EU) and 1

October 2015 (US) merchants are liable for all non EMV based transactions. As a result, adoption of EMV has increased momentum in the EU, but it is still lagging behind in other regions (mainly US and Asia).

### The human factor

An unfortunate side effect in the form of human (im)patience is also contributing to slower adoption of EMV. Swiping of a card is a quick and convenient way of making payments compared to entering at least four digits on a keypad. There are certain regions of the globe where people are reluctant to remember yet another PIN and don't wish to be slowed down by the process. For them, new and emerging contactless payment methods will be welcome. While some of these are still asking for a PIN for transactions over a certain limit such as PayPass (and that limit may vary per country), there are also semi-limitless options like Apple Pay.

### The connectivity issue

POS terminals can utilize different ways of communication for both in and outbound connections. Depending on the nature of the retailer, some might have strictly Ethernet cabling, but the likelihood of using Wi-Fi and 3/4G based communication is becoming more widespread. There are certain scenarios i.e. taxis where cabling is just not an option. Also, depending on the total number of terminals used and the network infrastructure, there might be servers dedicated to proxy requests towards the bank instead of every terminal having a direct connection. Whenever there is an unfiltered direct internet connection, there is a higher risk of data exfiltration going unnoticed.

*All of the factors mentioned above are in play when it comes to a merchant's ability – and willingness – to protect against POS based attacks.*

## Forks of a common codebase

One of the obvious questions is whether TinyPOS and PinkKite are really different malware families. The short answer is no, they are not different malware families. While it wouldn't take a significant amount of time for cybercriminals to recreate the assembly source code of the components by reversing existing samples, there are certain improvements to the codebase - especially to the memory scraper code – which can be found in both.

The main difference lies in the method of data exfiltration. TinyPOS variants aim for direct exfiltration over the internet, connecting to a pre-defined C2 and encrypting credit card data by a 32-bit key. The PinkKite approach is used in scenarios where direct exfiltration is not an option. Under such circumstances credit card data will be either stored on the local filesystem or the local network and encryption is done by a 64-bit key. The exfiltration process will be manual and will require persistence on the given system to access the previously saved data. As many PinkKite samples contain internal network addresses along with login credentials, it's safe to assume operators of the malware are gaining these by hacking into target systems after the initial reconnaissance stage.

```

.code:0040319A      push    [ebp+Buffer.BaseAddress] ; lpBaseAddress
.code:0040319D      push    dword ptr [esi+16Ch] ; hProcess
.code:004031A3      call   ds:ReadProcessMemory
.code:004031A9      cmp     dword ptr [esi+17Ch], 0
.code:004031B0      jnz    short loc_4031B7
.code:004031B2      jmp     loc_4030F3
; -----
.code:004031B7      loc_4031B7:                                ; CODE XREF: StartAddress+130↑j
.code:004031B7      xor     ebx, ebx
.code:004031B9      mov     ebx, [esi+17Ch]
.code:004031BF      mov     [esi+184h], ebx
.code:004031C5      mov     eax, [ebp+Buffer.BaseAddress]
.code:004031C8      add     eax, ebx
.code:004031CA      mov     [esi+164h], eax
.code:004031D0      mov     dword ptr [esi+180h], 0
.code:004031DA      loc_4031DA:                                ; CODE XREF: StartAddress+64A↑j
.code:004031DA      cmp     dword ptr [esi+180h], 64000h
.code:004031E4      jnz    short loc_4031E6
.code:004031E6      push    1 ; dwMilliseconds
.code:004031E8      call   ds:Sleep
.code:004031EE      loc_4031EE:                                ; CODE XREF: StartAddress+164↑j
.code:004031EE      mov     eax, [esi+180h]
.code:004031F4      cmp     eax, [esi+184h]
.code:004031FA      jnb     loc_4036CF
.code:00403200      mov     ebx, [esi+174h]
.code:00403206      add     ebx, [esi+180h]
.code:0040320C      cmp     byte ptr [ebx], 33h
.code:0040320F      jz     short loc_403224
.code:00403211      cmp     byte ptr [ebx], 34h
.code:00403214      jz     short loc_403224
.code:00403216      cmp     byte ptr [ebx], 35h
.code:00403219      jz     short loc_403224
.code:0040321B      cmp     byte ptr [ebx], 36h
.code:0040321E      jnz    loc_4036C4
; -----
.code:004031B7      loc_4031B7:                                ; CODE XREF: StartAddress+130↑j
.code:004031B7      xor     ebx, ebx
.code:004031B9      mov     ebx, [esi+17Ch]
.code:004031BF      mov     [esi+184h], ebx
.code:004031C5      mov     eax, [ebp+Buffer.BaseAddress]
.code:004031C8      add     eax, ebx
.code:004031CA      mov     [esi+164h], eax
.code:004031D0      mov     dword ptr [esi+180h], 0
.code:004031DA      loc_4031DA:                                ; CODE XREF: StartAddress+692↑j
.code:004031DA      cmp     dword ptr [esi+180h], 10000h
.code:004031E4      jz     short loc_403236
.code:004031E6      cmp     dword ptr [esi+180h], 20000h
.code:004031F0      jz     short loc_403236
.code:004031F2      cmp     dword ptr [esi+180h], 30000h
.code:004031FC      jz     short loc_403236
.code:004031FE      cmp     dword ptr [esi+180h], 40000h
.code:00403208      jz     short loc_403236
.code:0040320A      cmp     dword ptr [esi+180h], 50000h
.code:00403214      jz     short loc_403236
.code:00403216      cmp     dword ptr [esi+180h], 60000h
.code:00403220      jz     short loc_403236
.code:00403222      cmp     dword ptr [esi+180h], 70000h
.code:0040322C      jnz    short loc_403236
.code:0040322E      loc_40322E:                                ; CODE XREF: StartAddress+164↑j
; StartAddress+170↑j ...
; dwMilliseconds
.code:0040322E      push    1
.code:00403230      call   ds:Sleep
.code:00403236      loc_403236:                                ; CODE XREF: StartAddress+1AC↑j
.code:00403236      mov     eax, [esi+180h]
.code:0040323C      cmp     eax, [esi+184h]
.code:00403242      jnb     loc_403717
.code:00403248      mov     ebx, [esi+174h]
.code:0040324E      add     ebx, [esi+180h]
.code:00403254      cmp     byte ptr [ebx], 33h
.code:00403257      jz     short loc_40326C
.code:00403259      cmp     byte ptr [ebx], 34h
.code:0040325C      jz     short loc_40326C
.code:0040325E      cmp     byte ptr [ebx], 35h
.code:00403261      jz     short loc_40326C
.code:00403263      cmp     byte ptr [ebx], 36h
.code:00403266      jnz    loc_40370C

```

Figure 4 – Example of code evolution in the memory scraper module

## Protecting against POS fraud

### Individuals

First of all, you should make sure that your credit or debit card is EMV compliant. If it's not then your only option is to use the magnetic strip and most of the time that also requires you to hand over your card to a 3<sup>rd</sup> party. Reaching out to the issuer of the card and negotiating a replacement – EMV-based, or one even supporting contactless payment - prior to the original expiration date is highly advised.

### Merchants

The most important thing is to confirm the various connectivity options to and from the POS terminals prior to securing other aspects of the network. If the only option for terminals to reach out to the bank is through a proxy and no direct internet connection is provided, that can greatly reduce the chance of immediate data exfiltration. Also, in case maintaining and upgrading the terminals is handled by an external party, try to limit having open ports only for the duration of the scheduled sessions.

## Conclusion

As we can see it doesn't take hundreds or thousands of kilobytes of code to steal valuable credit card data on a large scale. The Tiny ecosystem is built from simple yet effective components – each one being responsible for a dedicated task – written in a low-level programming language that only very few programmers (i.e. people working with embedded systems) consider their 'weapon of choice'.

While Swipe-and-Sign exists as an authentication option for card-present transactions, POS malware like TinyPOS will continue to be effective. We strongly recommend that retailers and banks aggressively pursue a faster move to EMV (at least Chip-and-Signature, preferably Chip-and-PIN).

It is also recommended that an audit be performed on any system storing and transmitting personal data in relation to how that data is managed and stored. The goal should be to make it harder for credit card data to be extracted from the retailer's systems. This includes while in transit.

## Indicators of Compromise (IoC)

### Mutexes

edcfix  
srvrcard  
carmahot  
s2lxza0d  
t0cnhig9  
sqfinuk32  
thmnhig9  
hfDscs  
ntcrash  
xcm3264  
fswinine  
msoft  
fswinirchx  
fswinirchy  
fswinirch  
fwnmsft  
winfx1xf  
joycml1  
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62.210.36.112:27117  
62.210.36.112:3341  
77.72.84.115:17771  
85.93.20.42:1191  
85.93.20.42:1192

85.93.5.136:50011  
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## Files (SHA1)

### Memory scrapers

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## Downloaders

*Note: for brevity we have provided a reduced list of hashes for the downloaders. If you wish to have visibility of the complete list please reach out to us via <https://twitter.com/forcepointlabs>*

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